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This paper looks at the relation between democracy and economic growth. It analyses whether 
democracy has had a positive effect on the economic growth of Mauritius. This island is chosen 
for two reasons: it is the highest ranked democracy in Africa and has the second highest GDP 
per capita in the continent. While the results of a VAR quantitative analysis are not conclusive, 
an in depth qualitative analysis shows that a very big part of the miracle that Mauritius has 
achieved in terms of development would not have been possible without democracy.  




Aquesta tesina estudia la relació entre la democràcia i el creixement econòmic. El treball ana-
litza si la democràcia ha tingut un efecte positiu en el creixement econòmic de Maurici. Hem 
escollit aquest país per dues raons: està considerat el més democràtic d’Àfrica i disposa de la 
segona renda per capita més alta del continent. Tot i que els resultats del anàlisi quantitatiu no 
son conclusius, l’anàlisi qualitatiu demostra que una gran part del miracle mauricià de desen-
volupament no hauria estat possible sense democràcia.    
Paraules claus: Maurici, Democràcia, Desenvolupament Econòmic, Creixement Econòmic, 
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The Human Development Index of the United Nations allows to rank the countries from more 
developed to less develop. 40 among the top 50 countries (the more developed) of the ranking 
are considered advanced democracies by The Economist, seven of them are dictatorships and 
three of them are “democracies” controlled by a single party1. On the other hand, among the 50 
countries at the bottom of the ranking, we find only four democracies: Vanuatu, Gambia, Ghana 
and Lesotho.  Another important characteristic that we need to say is that 41 of these 50 coun-
tries in the bottom are located in Africa; 76% of the countries in that continent are amongst the 
least developed in the world. With this data in hand, the reader may conclude that the best way 
to develop a country is through democracy. His/her might also think about the different prob-
lems that Africa is experiencing in terms of development. The problem is that with this topic 
there is not that straightforward conclusion (as our imaginary reader did), because it is not clear 
whether democracy is causing economic growth or democracy is caused by economic growth.  
The view that “democracy” was the “best” way to develop a country was the dominant one until 
the 1960’s. In that decade a new type of countries started to appear: the newly industrialized 
countries (NIC’s). They appeared in East Asia and also in South America. They were charac-
terized by being authoritarian regimes that created market-friendly institutions and export- ori-
ented economies. These regimes promoted the accumulation of physical and human capital to 
converge with the “rich” western countries. Some economists concluded that the most im-
portant achievement made by these regimes was securing property rights for private companies 
and investors. Democracy was not the only type of institutional system that could keep com-
mitment in the laws passed, institutions that could work properly and also that could keep the 
rent-seekers out of the picture. The debate on the relation between democracy and development 
was further enhanced by a paper by Seymour Lipset published in 1959: Some Social Requisites 
of Democracy : Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The author argued that 
democracy without human capital (education) was destined to fail. Cause uneducated people 
tend to be more attracted to extremist ideas that could jeopardize the whole system.  
This research ponders whether the way for Africa to develop is through democracy. The 
hyphotesis is that democracy has a positive effect on the economic development of a country.  
To test the hypothesis, we propose a study in depth of Mauritius, one of the few African 
countries considered developed and also a working democracy. The research is structured in 
six chapters. After a brief second chapter on how different Internation Economic Organizations 
establish the degree of development of a country, the third chapter focuses on the factors of 
development identified by the economic literature. The fourth chapter then presents and justifies 
the methodology, chapter five presents the results of the quantitative analysis and chapter six 
the results of the qualitative analysis. Chapter seven concludes.   
     
                                                             
1 The Russian Federation, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR 
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II. IEO’S CLASSIFICATIONS OF COUNTRIES BASED ON THEIR DE-
VELOPMENT 
1. Introduction                                                                                                             
According to the Society of International Development Israel development can be defined as 
“a process that creates growth, progress, positive change or the addition of physical, economic, 
environmental, social and demographic components”(SID ISRAEL, 2020), it is a perfectly 
good definition. The problem comes when we need to classify countries in developed and un-
derdeveloped for “operational” motives. In order for the International Economic Organizations 
(IEO) to know what countries need more help and from which countries to ask for funding, they 
need to stablish a threshold that classifies the country. These thresholds will need, moreover, to 
be dynamic. Development is a process which means that it is continuous, there is no limit in 
development. The so-called developed countries continue to develop nowadays and they will 
continue to do it in the future. This continuity means that the developed threshold will continue 
to increase, meaning the in a near future the values that form this threshold could be higher than 
the values of the most developed country nowadays. The objective of this chapter is to explain 
which the threshold is established by three key IEOS that focus on development: the World 
Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), and the reasons behind each.   
2. Classification of countries according to the World Bank 
The WB is an International Organization created after the II World War to help reduce the in-
come gap between countries. This section explains how it classifies these countries into devel-
oped and developing countries as well as the reasons for having a classification.  
2.1 Which is the threshold?                                                                                             
The main indicator that the WB uses to measure development in order to establish the classifi-
cation is the GNI per capita in US dollars using the Athlas method. It uses this indicator because 
it is “strongly correlated with other non-economic indicators such as life expectancy at birth, 
mortality rates of children, and enrollment rates in school.” (World Bank, 2020) This barometer 
have problems measuring the economy of the poorest countries in the world, due to the fact that 
a big number of their population is dedicated to subsistence activities that are not reflected in 
this indicator. This problem could cause the GNI to be underestimated. It also experiences the 
same problem as the GDP per capita which doesn t́ reflect inequalities in the distribution of 
income. 
2.2 Why a classification? 
The WB needs to distinguish between developed and developing countries basically for opera-
tional reasons. The most important goal that the Bank has is the eradication of poverty and 
helping underdeveloped countries to develop. To carry out these objectives the Bank created 
five institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International 
Development Association (IDA), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
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Disputes (ICSID). While the later three focus on fostering the private sector, the first two offer 
financial support to the governments of developing countries. These two institutions were born 
to help the middle and low income countries respectively.  
The IDA takes care of the countries (with grants and zero percent interest loans) that have a 
GNI per capita below 1.025$ and cannot borrow from international markets. While the IBRD 
gives loans with interest to the countries that are considered middle income: GNI per capita 
between (1.025$ and 12.376$.). We have to make an important consideration here, the WB 
divides this group into two smaller groups: lower middle (GNI per capita between 1.025$ and 
3.996$) and upper middle (between 3.996$ and 12.376$). The argument behind this split, is 
that countries located inside the lower middle group they still have a lot in common with the 
lower income group (low degree of creditworthiness) and that the ones located in the upper 
middle have different necessities (advisement in different policies, attracting more FDI). Fi-
nally, we have the countries who have more than 12.376$. The main purpose of these countries 
is to finance both institutions, they cannot receive financial support from the WB. 
                                                                                                                                                      
3. Classification of countries according to the IMF                                                          
The IMF is an International Organization created after the II World War to help ensure the 
stability of the international monetary system by providing loans to member countries with a 
balance of payments crisis. While its main objective is not the development of developing coun-
tries, it still needs to distinguish between developed and developing countries.  
3.1 Which is the threshold? 
The IMF does not explain which the threshold that uses to distinguish between developed and 
developing countries. This may be due to the fact that this institution is mainly interested in 
identifying the less developed group of countries. While usually this group includes the same 
countries as the low-income group of the WB, it is not a perfect match.  
3.2 Why a classification?                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Again, the classification is mostly the result of operational needs. It was introduced in 1986 
when the IMF stablished the structural adjustment fund. The main idea was to help “all low-
income countries eligible for IDA resources that are in need of such resources and face pro-
tracted balance of payments problems” (Nielsen 2011, 6).Nowadays the IMF is in charge for 
accepting new members into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility2 (PRGF).  We see that 
in this case the IMF was required to make this list, to know exactly which underdeveloped 
countries were experiencing balance of payments problems. 
The IMF also uses a classification between developed and developing countries for analytical 
reasons. Its annual publication World Economic Outlook   offers a classification of the countries 
based on their level of development. The countries are divided into two groups: advanced econ-
omies and developing countries. The only hint that we have about what criteria the IMF uses in 
                                                             
2 The PRGF is the institution of the IMF that give money to the poorest countries. The country must have 2 requisites: be 
eligible to get IDA resources and have a balance of payment crisis  
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order to determine what a developed country is and what is not, is from 1997. That year Israel, 
Korea and Singapore changed groups. The reason was the following “rapid economic develop-
ment and the fact that they now all share a number of important characteristics with the indus-
trial countries, including relatively high income levels (comfortably within the range of those 
in the industrial country group), well-developed financial markets and high degrees of financial 
intermediation and diversified economic structures with rapidly growing service sectors.”(Niel-
sen 2011, 17) After this paper, the IMF has not given any more definition about what considers 
to be a definition of an advanced economy. 
 
4. Classification of countries according to the UNDP 
The UNDP is part of the United Nations. Its objective is to put forward a non-economic 
threshold to distinguish between developed and developing countries 
4.1 Which is the threshold?   
The Human Development Index (HDI) is grounded on three dimensions that are considered the 
keystones of human development: healthy life, education, and a decent standard of living or 
income. To measure these dimensions the UNDP uses three indicators. Life expectancy at birth 
is used as a proxy of a healthy life; for education it is a combination of the mean of the actual 
years that adults aged 25 years or more have studied and the expected years of study for new-
borns; finally, income or standard of living is measured with the Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita in local currency converted into US dollars using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
After the value of these indicators is found, they need to pass a process of transformation in 
order to be put into the index. The formula for the transformation is the following:                                                                                                                              
X = (Xactual – Xmin)/(Xmax – Xmin)                                                                                                
The maximum value in the case of every indicator is the highest value observed in a certain 
period of time. The actual value is the value observed in the year of the study. While the mini-
mum value is different for every indicator (for education it is 0; for life expectancy it is 20 
years; and for income it is 163$ which is the lowest value ever observed. The result of this 
formula will give us for each country a result between zero and one (zero being the lowest, one 
the highest). After the results, the countries are put into a classification where, the top quartile 
of the distribution is considered to be developed, while the other three are considered develop-
ing.       
4.2 Why a classification? 
The main purpose of this classification is analytical. It is based on the assumption that to es-
tablish a good classification we should look at more indicators than just the economic ones. 
The exact words are “people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing 








The IEO’s do not have a general agreement for what should be considered the development 
threshold. Moreover, they do not usually clarify why they consider this threshold to be the 
appropriate.  One possible reason for this to happen is that this threshold is the one which ben-
efits them the most when carrying out their main function (we cannot forget that the main func-
tion of these organizations is not the classifications, but rather ending poverty and helping coun-
tries develop in the case of the WB and helping countries to maintain a correct balance of pay-
ments in the case of the IMF). Finally, even when they use similar variables, they still use 
different calculation methods. As an example, the UNPD to measure income uses the GNI per 
capita by PPP in return the WB uses the GNI per capita by the Atlas method. This problem 
leads to the point where we find that countries can be considered developed and underdeveloped 
at the same time.  
                                                                                                                         



















III. DEVELOPMENT FACTORS 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we talked about the difficulty of creating a development threshold, 
due to the different opinions or calculations methods that can be used in order to create one. 
In this chapter we present the development factors identified by the economic literature.  The 
first section focuses on the exogenous and endogenous “economic” factors while the second 
section explains the “non-economic” institutional factors.  
2. Economic factors               
The economic literature identifies three main development factors: capital, labor and technol-
ogy.  This section presents the main economic models around these factors taking into ac-
count that they have been studied through two different perspectives: as exogenous or as en-
dogenous. The first perspective is better at explaining the first stages of development while 
the second tries to explain long-term growth.   
2.1.Exogenous Theories 
The typical neoclassical function of production (it is widely used in economics) is Y = 
F(A,K,L). What this function is saying is that output depends on technology (A), capital (K) 
and labor (L).  There are a lot of theories that try to explain the role of each factor in terms of 
contribution to the growth.    
The Capital Accumulation theory focuses on the contribution of capital to growth and is cap-
tured by the Harrod-Domar model (1946). This theory gave origin to the so-called capital fun-
damentalist movement which consist in investment and capital accumulation playing a key role 
in economic growth. The most important assumption of this model is the following: “GDP 
growth will be proportional to the share of investment spending in GDP” (Easterly 1997, 3) 
what this assumption is stating, is that in this model capital (machines) is the constraint in the 
economy. We are always going to have people that can run the machines (Domar’s theory came 
out during the great depression time).  
The focus shifted to labor mixed with capital accumulation in the next evolution of this model, 
which was presented by Arthur Lewis in his book: Development Planning: The Essentials of 
Economic Policy (1966). In this book Arthur Lewis considered labor rich developing countries. 
His work started by making this statement: “the central problem in the theory of economic 
development is to understand the process by which a community which was previously saving 
and investing four or five per cent of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy 
where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent of national income or more”(Gollin 
2014, 82). The existence of this problem is strongly related to the assumption made by Arthur 
Lewis that the supply of capital is fixed in the short run (the author introduces foreign assistance 
and investment as a way to solve this problem) for the underdeveloped countries. In his words: 
“Not enough machines for all of the people”.   
Arthur Lewis theorized about a two-sector economy in a country. One, which has big amounts 
of unused labor and low productivity normally called the agricultural sector (even though the 
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author acknowledges that this sector have parts that are at the same level in terms of productivity 
as the advanced sector). The other is the so-called high productivity sector, the only sector able 
to reinvest their earnings because they experience profits. In this model the only source that is 
able to create some kind of growth is capital. Why? Because in the unproductive sector, the 
productivity is so low, due to the vast amounts of labor that erases the necessity of investment 
(K) that makes productivity increase. Thanks to this huge amount of labor available in this 
“poor” sector, the capitalist sector can hire these “surplus” workers for a wage that is slightly 
above the subsistence line. These new workers will produce a higher output in this sector than 
in the former, due to the level of capital that is invested in this modernistic sector.  
In the short time this big difference between the output produced and the wages paid to the 
workers is translated into big profits. The profits will be reinvested in order to increase the level 
of production. From the short time we can take the conclusion that the reinvestment is originat-
ing economic growth for the country. This new level of production is going to increase the 
demand for new workers, this new people will produce less than the old workers (decreasing 
marginal products) but they are going to be paid the same (profits will decrease), at the end due 
to the increasing demand for workers we will reach a point where the supply of labor from the 
antiquated sector is exhausted, thus starting a competition between capitalists in order to attract 
workers (Wages will increase). This increase in wages and the decrease of the marginal produc-
tivity with every new worker added will cause a decrease in profits thus reducing investment. 
Arthur Lewis called this the turning point of an economy. This is the moment where you cannot 
longer growth by accumulation of capital, but you have to find other ways. In other words, this 
is the moment when a country reaches the steady state3.   
The Solow-Swan model focuses on technology in the long run and capital accumulation in the 
short. The main equation contains three factors: Capital, Labor and Technology. The model 
considers the growth of labor as something constant. One of the most important assumptions 
that the model makes is that technology is exogenous4. It is given to the country. Knowing that 
the growth of the population is constant over time and that technology is exogenous, the only 
parameter left is capital. The importance of capital can be summarized in the following state-
ment: If a country is able to increase the rate of savings this will be translated into an increase 
in the rate of growth of the economy, but this way of growing only works for a certain period 
of time. The economy will reach a certain state where growth of the national product is going 
to be equal to the growth of the technology in the economy.  
One of the reasons that the model uses to justify the steady state is that capital experience di-
minishing returns. At the early stages of development capital investment is extremely produc-
tive. We do not have to use any of the new machines to substitute the old ones so all of the 
investment will be focused in creating new product thus the growth rate of the GDP will be 
really high in the first periods of development, but time passes which affects both population 
and the number of machines that need substitution which means that now, we will be forced to 
use a high percentage of the savings in substituting machines and also maintaining the ratio of 
                                                             
3 The definition of the steady state is the moment when the “national” economy of a country reaches a state, where the whole 
production of a country is dedicated to substitute the depreciated machines. Thus reaching a constant growth.   
4 It is considered exogenous due to the difficulty of calculation the technology parameter 
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Capital/Labor at the same rate. Which means that the growth rate is going to be lower (the 
percentage of new machines that are going to be used for new production will be smaller as 
time passes). This will end the moment we are forced to use the whole savings of the population 
into substituting machines and keeping the ratio stable. When we reach this point/state Solow 
argues that growth will be equal to the rate of technological change. In other words, we are not 
able to accumulate more capital so the only way to increase the growth rate (more production) 
is to improve the machines, so they are more productive than the last ones. 
One important question regarding development is if poor countries are able to catch or converge 
with the rich. Robert Solow’s answer is yes, a conditional yes. Countries will be able to catch 
the rich ones as long as they have the same saving rate, depreciation rate, population and more 
important they share the same technology (Aghion and Hewitt 2009, 29). The Mankiw-Romer-
Weil model presented in 1992 challenges this positive conclusion. It considers that this conver-
gence should not be taken as a given.  
Mankiw, Romer and Weil accept the Solow model as the reference but criticize the conclusions 
regarding the weight that labor and savings have in the economy. They introduce a third factor 
in the Solow equation: Human Capital (the workers are more prepared because they can learn). 
The authors argue that Human Capital is correlated with these two factors “for any given rate 
of human-capital accumulation, higher savings or lower population growth leads to a higher 
level of income and thus a higher level of human capital” (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1990, 2) 
The novelty that their paper introduces is the existence of multiple steady states where the dif-
ferent countries are going to end. A poor country will not necessary converge with the rich ones 
but rather  this poor country will reach a certain steady state, the one that matches the level of 
human capital, population growth and the saving rate of the country. After it reaches the first 
steady state, which can be broken if this country raises the saving rate which will be translated 
into a higher level of human capital.  
To summarize what this model tries to do is explain how human capital plays a role in increas-
ing the effect of capital accumulation in the economy (skilled workers are much more produc-
tive that unskilled workers). It also defends Solow conclusion regarding the existence of steady 
states, a thing that the endogenous growth models eliminates, because the latter claim that di-
minishing returns of capital are offset by the increase and change of the technological rate.   
        2.2 Endogenous Theories 
The neoclassical growth theory (Solow Model) makes a great job in explaining the early stages 
of growth (capital accumulation) but it lacks of a strong explanation for the long run because it 
considers technology as exogenous. This is the claim of the Endogenous Models.                                                                                                  
The AK Model developed by Marvin Frankel is considered one of the earliest if not the first 
endogenous model. It tries to explain the endogeneity of technology using the Learning by 
doing process developed by Kenneth Arrow in 1962. Learning by doing (Lbd from now on) 
consists in a bunch of small firms that pay K and L to their marginal product (competitive 
equilibrium). But these firms get better and better in allocating the necessary resources every 
new time that they have to produce, they also know where they have to spend the money. The 
interesting part about this is that this process does not incentivize investing in new technology, 
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you do not get a special status (patent) that allows you to have a monopoly for at least a certain 
time. Going back to the AK model. The proponents of this model believed that the Lbd was 
able to reduce or even offset the effect of diminishing returns of capital. Easy to comprehend 
how Lbd could cause that: every time we produce, we get new knowledge on how to allocate 
resources or in which part of the process we can save money. To answer the question we made 
at the beginning: the AK model believes that the long run growth of a country is going to depend 
of savings and the allocation that a company can make (Aghion and Hewitt 2009, 48).  
The AK model is thus able to give an explanation for the positive long growth of the economy. 
The accumulation of capital creates positive externalities (Aghion and Hewitt 2009, 66) (Lbd) 
that allow a positive long run growth (because these externalities offset the diminishing returns 
conditions set by the neoclassical model). The problem is that this model does not show a con-
vergence between the poor and the rich countries (the model considers constant returns to 
scale).  To give a compelling answer for this problem of explaining what is causing the long 
run growth of an economy Paul Romer in 1990 wrote a paper called Endogenous technological 
change.  
The Romer Model (also called the product variety model) accepts that the long run growth is 
determined by the growth rate of technology (Whelan 2014, 1). Nevertheless, while Robert 
Solow considered technology as something given, Paul Romer tries to explain what is causing 
a growth of technology. One of the main criticism of Paul Romer is that the older models tend 
to neglect the role that the private firms play in research and investing;  “The second premise 
is that technological change arises in large part because of intentional actions taken by people 
who respond to market incentives” (Romer. 1989, 4). To solve this, Paul Romer introduces a 
monopolistic scenario where companies that invest in research, are allowed to enjoy being a 
monopoly at least for a certain period of time. In this period of time, this company will have 
profits as a reward and also as an incentive to invest more in research. The summary of the 
model is: we will have some companies specialized in creating designs “plans” for new prod-
ucts (inputs); to incentivize the investing and research for new products, these companies will 
enjoy imperfect competition in order to get profits (they become price-setters).  
The interesting thing about these “plans” is that Paul Romer considered them non-rival and 
partially excludable. Why? He argued that the monopoly was only awarded if a company 
wanted to produce the intermediate product, if another company or researcher just wanted to 
study them to see if they could improve or create another product they were free to do that. One 
of the assumptions of Paul Romer was that the pool of knowledge “all of the designs created 
through history” should be non-excludable and non-rival, everyone should have access to this 
pool. Moreover, the progressive increase in the number of intermediate products available 
would cause labour to specialize more thus increasing productivity (more benefits for the com-
pany).  The outtake is that the economy will grow in the long run as the same rate as these 
research companies are able to produce new designs for the intermediate products. The role of 
the private companies in researching and creating technology is far more important than the one 
given by the older models. 
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Phillipe Aghion and Peter Howitt in 1992 challenged one of the assumptions of the Romer 
model: that even though the economy produces new intermediate products, these “new” prod-
ucts are not considered substitutes of the old ones. In short, they challenged the idea that the 
old products continue to be used by companies, that there is no “creative destruction” (Schum-
peter) or obsolescence. In their Schumpeterian model, the authors claim that the innovations 
that cause the long run growth should render obsolete, the products that were created before. In 
this model Phillipe Aghion and Peter Howitt included the possibility that the firm or entrepre-
neur could fail to create a better product. Meaning that technology could not grow for a year 
.This means that the long run growth rate of the economy in this model will be equal to the 
growth rate of technology the years that the firms are able to create a new product.  
Again this model supports the role that the patents play in incentivizing research which in the 
end translates into greater growth of the economy. In terms of convergence, what this model 
says is that if a poor country is able to implement what is considered the latest technology, the 
effects in the economy will be much higher that if a developed country implements the same 
technology (Aghion and Howitt  2009, 92).   
3. Non-economic Factors 
The literature of economic development also includes authors that underline the importance of 
non-economic factors. We can distinguish two main types of non-economic factors: the insti-
tutional and the geographic.  
                 3.1. The institutional factors 
The endogenous models accept that institutions can play a role in helping the growth of the 
economy in a country. We see it on the product variety and Schumpeterian models, how patents 
and property rights incentivize research thus making the economy growth. Other authors have 
gone further and claimed that institutional factors can cause development. These models usually 
accept the definition of institutions proposed by Douglass North in 1981:  “a set of rules, pro-
cedures and moral and ethical norms designed to constraint the behavior of individuals in the 
interest of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals”(Glaeser et al. 2004, 275). In other 
words, institutions are the rules of the game that create obligations for the individual to fulfill 
in the interest of society as a whole.   
Already in 1960, Seymour Lipset argued that a richer nation has a higher chance of maintaining 
and improving the level of institutions. The author specifically mentions the level of education 
as vital for the development of good institutions inside the country even though he also includes 
urbanization and industrialization as important. Seymour Lipset argued that an educated popu-
lation is less likely to support extremist ideas and to support the democratic ones. He also men-
tions that literate citizens are less likely to get into fights, wars and conflicts. Unless a country 
is able to develop good institutions, it will suffer from “imbalances which tend to accelerate 
social disorganization” (Lipset 2013, 81). In other words, if we have big cities full of illiterate 
people (normally rejected by society) there is a high chance that groups that want more political 
power (oligarchs) will take advantage of them.  As a result, Seymour Lipset supports some 
redistribution to increase the wellbeing of the lower classes. He argues that if we increase the 
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welfare, the “poor” people will be less seduced by the extremists and more willing to participate 
in the decisions (voting in the elections).  
While education (human capital) plays a role in calming and making the population more will-
ingly to participate in the institutions, dictatorships can implement reforms to improve educa-
tion. For Seymour Lipset, democracy can survive only in rich countries. Even if we force de-
mocracy into poor countries, the internal situation of the country (illiteracy, lack of wealth re-
distribution, etc) will not allow democracy to succeed.   
In 2004, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson in the paper “Institutions as 
the fundamental cause of long-run growth” argued that institutions shape the people living in-
side the country. We see that this is a departure from Seymour Lipset’s view. The paper con-
siders two types of institutions, economic and political. The argument is that the economic in-
stitutions (the ones that have a direct effect in the growth of the economy and the redistribution 
of wealth) depend on the political ones. Why? Because in case of conflict between two groups 
of the society, the ones that will obtain control of the economic institutions are the ones who 
have the more political power. The authors distinguish between de jure and de facto political 
power. The former being the classic institutions from where the power emerges (Parliament, 
constitution, justice) the latter being the power that can make the legal power crumble (money 
to buy mercenaries, media power or the ability to force the military). The origins of these two 
powers come from the political institutions for the de jure and the redistribution of wealth for 
the de facto. The percentage of the total wealth that is redistributed has a direct effect on the 
power to affect the institutions.  
The summary of the theory is that the political institutions and the redistribution of wealth shape 
the political power of the country (de jure and de facto) and this political power shapes the 
political and economic institutions (the social class which benefitted in the last period will fight 
to maintain these institutions, while the others will fight to change it), that are in charge of 
redistributing the wealth and therefore will also shape the economic performance of the country 
that year. We see that this theory acknowledges the role of constraining the political powers 
and also opening those powers to the majority of the population in order to have better institu-
tions. In other words, democracy will cause better economic institutions (and thus growth) than 
others form of government. As an appendix this theory gives major importance to the commit-
ment problems, a problem that we will explore more profoundly in the following pages. 
The last theory that we have to comment is the inclusive and extractive institutional model. This 
theory was proposed by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson on its book “Why nations fail” 
(2012). This book introduces the theory that extractive and inclusive institutions played a vital 
role in shaping the future of the countries.  The extractive institutions are characterized by the 
exploitation of the many by the few. In other words the majority of the population works for 
the benefit of the minority. The authors argue that this type of institutions can cause economic 
growth in the short run but in the long run they will fail, because, they are not prepared to 
assume the costs of the innovations carry as we have seen in the product variety model and also 
in the Solow-Swan model innovations in the different sectors will render obsolete many prod-
ucts. These innovations can cause unemployment or instability because the obsolete products 
will no longer be produced and thus the workers that produce them are more susceptible of 
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demanding political change. The oxymoron of this exclusive institutions are the inclusive ones, 
these types of institutions are based in the rule of the majority, and according to the authors 
these institutions might promote a smaller level of growth in the short run but on the other hand 
they deliver bigger growths in the long run, because they are better prepared to handle the “cre-
ative destruction” caused by technology.    
         3.2. The geographical factors 
There is multitude of papers and theories regarding these factors. The chapter “Theories of root 
causes of economic progress,” of the book by Sambit Bhattacharyya: Growth miracles and 
growth debacles exploring the root causes (2011) explains that as early as 1748 Montesquieu 
proposed a theory where hot climates affect negatively the brain thus eliminating motivation to 
prosper and develop. Another view inside this theory is the one proposed by John Gallup and 
Jeffrey Sachs (2000) who argued that the soils in hot places cannot grow as many plans due to 
a lot of biological problems (acidification, hot weather, humidity). Similarly, Jared Diamond 
(1997) argued that the different type of animals and plants present in the different areas of the 
world shaped the posterior development of those civilizations.  
There are also debate on how illness affects economic growth. Jeffrey Sachs (2003) argues that 
Malaria affects economic growth through agricultural output in Africa. The illness reduces 
productivity thus making it impossible to have good product to sell which causes a lack of 
market development which reduces the possibility of growth. Daron Acemoglu et al (2004), 
however, considers that the negative impact of Malaria in economic growth comes from its 
influence in the de facto power of the country, making it more probable for that country to have 

















This chapter shows that a perfect or unique way to develop a country does not exist. We have 
a variety of imperfect ways that can work. The economic literature on economic growth allows 
to differentiate between explanations that support a primary role of the economic factors (K,L 
and A) vs the ones that support a more human role (Geography, Institutions, Illness...).  
In the area of the economic factors, there is consensus that technology affects the development 
of a country both in the short and long run. The problem is the discussion of the generation of 
this technology. Robert Solow and his followers would argue that technology is created exog-
enously because we do not have the tools to calculate it. While Paul Romer, Joseph Schumpeter, 
Kenneth Arrow and a bunch of other authors would say that technology is the consequence of 
education and a will to improve life on earth in every period of history. Another important 
source of discussion in this field is about the convergence topic. Here Robert Solow argues that 
a conditional convergence exists between rich and poor countries (In this topic, the followers 
of Solow: Mankiw-Romer-Weil recognize that sometimes, convergence will not occur). While 
the endogenous authors argue that with constant or even increasing returns this is not possible 
at any case.  
It might look that discussions only occur in the “economic” area but in the “human” area we 
also find discussions and disagreements. Regarding institutions, the debate is about the type of 
political power that can create good institutions. Seymour Lipset argues that the person in power 
can create the proper institutions to fuel growth and these institutions will start evolving into 
democracy due to the presence of educated individuals in bigger numbers in the society. On the 
other hand, Daron Acemoglu et al argue that only institutions that are controlled by the majority 

















Chapter one has showed that there are different ways to establish which countries are developed 
or developing. Three of the main IEOs used different methods to establish their classifications 
leading to some countries being considered developing in one classification and developed in 
the other. Chapter two indicates that there are also different ways to explain why countries 
developed. A review of the economic literature shows that there are several possible explana-
tory factors.  
The objective of this chapter is to explain and justify the methodology used to test the hypoth-
esis that democracy has positive effects in the growth of the income. The first section justifies 
the selection of Mauritius as case study. The second section explains both the quantitative anal-
ysis and the qualitative one. For the quantitative analysis we will use a basic Vector Auto Re-
gression (VAR) model, while for the qualitative analysis we compare the VAR results to the 
economic history of Mauritius.  
1. The case study  
We propose a methodology based on the analysis of a case study: Mauritius. Various reasons 
justify the selection. The first is that the ultimate objective of this research is to establish 
whether the countries of the African continent have an economic interest in fostering democ-
racy. Therefore, it makes sense to select as case study an African country. The second reason 
has to do with the need to test whether there was a relation between development and democracy 
implied in the hypothesis. To be able to establish the presence of that relation we need a country 
which is both developed (at least from African standards and taking into account all three IEOs 
definitions of development) as well as democratic. Mauritus is one of the few to comply with 
both conditions. It is ranked as a high human development country by the UNDP (see Table 1). 
The WB ranks Mauritius as an Upper Middle-Income country but according to its more recent 
data the country is closing the gap with the countries considered High Income (see Table 1). 
We also see that the IMF ranks Mauritius as the second country with the highest GDP per capita 
in the whole African continent. Finally, The Economist democracy index5 ranks Mauritius as 
the most powerful and stable democracy in Africa, it ranks the 18 th in the world. According to 
this index, the Mauritius democracy is more powerful and free than the Spanish 19th  and French 
20th  democracies.     
What we want to test with this case study is whether democracy has a positive or negative 
(maybe neutral) effect in the growth of the country. Or maybe it is for other reasons that the 
country is able to develop. 
 
                                                             
5 The Economist democracy index “is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; the functioning of govern-
ment; political participation; political culture; and civil liberties. Based on its scores on a range of indicators within these 
categories, each country is then itself classified as one of four types of regime: "full democracy", "flawed democracy", "hy-
brid regime" or "authoritarian regime"”. 
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Table 1: Classification of the countries in the African continent according to the criteria 































Index (HDI) Income Group
GDP per Capita* ( 
Current prices)
Country Value Country Country
2017 2019
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Seychelles 0,797 Seychelles High income Seychelles 31808,941
Mauritius 0,790 Mauritius 25029,41
Lebanon 0,757 Algeria Upper middle income Equatorial Guinea 21441,148
Algeria 0,754 Lebanon Upper middle income Gabon 19158,805
Tunisia 0,735 Libya Upper middle income Botswana 18653,684
Botswana 0,717 Botswana Upper middle income Algeria 15765,504
Libya 0,706 Equatorial Guinea Upper middle income Lebanon 15208,308
Gabon 0,702 Gabon Upper middle income Egypt 14028,032
Mauritius Upper middle income South Africa 13865,192
South Africa 0,699 Namibia Upper middle income Tunisia 12800,789
Egypt 0,696 South Africa Upper middle income Libya 12050,582
Morocco 0,667 Namibia 11369,129
Cabo Verde 0,654 Djibouti Lower middle income Eswatini 11088,686
Namibia 0,647 Egypt, Arab Rep. Lower middle income Morocco 9283,757
Congo 0,606 Morocco Lower middle income Cabo Verde 7727,277
Ghana 0,592 Tunisia Lower middle income Congo, Republic of 7118,806
Equatorial Guinea 0,591 Angola Lower middle income Ghana 6998,311
Kenya 0,590 Cabo Verde Lower middle income Angola 6763,355
Sao Tome and Principe 0,589 Cameroon Lower middle income Nigeria 6098,342
Eswatini (Kingdom of) 0,588 Comoros Lower middle income Côte d'Ivoire 4454,104
Zambia 0,588 Congo, Rep. Lower middle income Mauritania 4200,906
Angola 0,581 Côte d'Ivoire Lower middle income Zambia 4176,654
Cameroon 0,556 Eswatini Lower middle income Sudan 4088,712
Ghana Lower middle income Djibouti 3999,252
Tanzania (United Republic of) 0,538 Kenya Lower middle income Cameroon 3964,646
Zimbabwe 0,535 Lesotho Lower middle income Kenya 3868,628
Nigeria 0,532 Mauritania Lower middle income Senegal 3863,555
Rwanda 0,524 Nigeria Lower middle income Tanzania 3573,466
Lesotho 0,520 São Tomé and Principe Lower middle income Lesotho 3564,386
Mauritania 0,520 Senegal Lower middle income São Tomé and Príncipe 3441,343
Madagascar 0,519 Sudan Lower middle income Gambia, The 2903,116
Uganda 0,516 Zambia Lower middle income Uganda 2621,886
Benin 0,515 Zimbabwe Lower middle income Zimbabwe 2620,361
Senegal 0,505 Benin 2561,936
Comoros 0,503 Benin Low income Ethiopia 2516,666
Togo 0,503 Burkina Faso Low income Chad 2505,22
Sudan 0,502 Burundi Low income Mali 2473,837
Côte d'Ivoire 0,492 Central African Republic Low income Rwanda 2444,085
Malawi 0,477 Chad Low income Guinea 2429,103
Djibouti 0,476 Congo, Dem. Rep. Low income Yemen 2404,354
Ethiopia 0,463 Eritrea Low income Burkina Faso 2095,573
Gambia 0,460 Ethiopia Low income Guinea-Bissau 2025,291
Guinea 0,459 Gambia, The Low income Togo 1820,515
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 0,457 Guinea Low income Eritrea 1717,739
Guinea-Bissau 0,455 Guinea-Bissau Low income Sierra Leone 1701,039
Yemen 0,452 Liberia Low income Madagascar 1698,33
Eritrea 0,440 Madagascar Low income Comoros 1662,405
Mozambique 0,437 Malawi Low income South Sudan, Republic of 1613,095
Liberia 0,435 Mali Low income Liberia 1413,006
Mali 0,427 Mozambique Low income Mozambique 1331,104
Burkina Faso 0,423 Niger Low income Niger 1279,623
Sierra Leone 0,419 Rwanda Low income Malawi 1234,01
Burundi 0,417 Sierra Leone Low income Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 791,19
Chad 0,404 Somalia Low income Central African Republic 746,464
South Sudan 0,388 South Sudan Low income Burundi 726,885
Central African Republic 0,367 Tanzania Low income
Niger 0,354 Togo Low income
Uganda Low income
Somalia ..
Human development groups Income Groups GNI/n using the atlas method
Very high human development 0,894 High Income 12.375$ or More
High human development 0,757 Upper Middle Income 3.996$-12.375$
Medium human development 0,645 Lower Middle Income 1.026$-3.995$
Low human development 0,504 Low Income 0$-1.026$






OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
HIGH INCOME
LOW INCOME
*GDP per capita, current prices (Purchasing 
power parity; international dollars per capita)
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2. Methods of analysis 
To test the hypothesis that democracy has a positive effect on the economic development of a 
country, we propose to study the case of Mauritius, an African country which is both more 
developed and democratic than the rest.  To do so, first we will perform the quantitative analysis 
(Granger Causality using the Toda and Yamamoto approach) But we will not say if the hypoth-
esis is rejected or not, because first we want to perform the next step. The next step will consist 
in analyzing the country using the qualitative analysis (Historical, Political and also economic). 
After performing this analysis we will compare the results we get with the ones obtained by the 
quantitative analysis and then we will say if we reject or not the hypothesis. 
2.1 Quantitative Analysis 
The period under analysis is 1968-2012. The reason for this is that Mauritius gained its inde-
pendence in 1967, meaning that it is not in our best interests to use the data before that. Nowa-
days apart from the French islands that are under control of France, the other African countries 
are independent.  
In this analysis we use three variables: two for democracy and one for growth. The latter vari-
able in play is GDP per capita. GDP divided by the population of the country. The first democ-
racy variable is the variable liberal democracy from the database v-dem. V-DEM is the database 
of a project whose main objective is to measure the value of democracy through the history of 
mankind. This variable includes the restrictions that citizens place in the government power, 
the degree that the civil liberties are protected by the constitution, a measure of the independ-
ence of the judicial system, another measure of how strong the rule of law is and also includes 
the score of how clean are the elections in that country. Score of the variable (zero-one). One 
being the highest, zero being the lowest score. The score can adopt any number between zero 
and one.  
The second democracy variable comes from the same database v-dem but from another source: 
Polity IV. The variable name is called e_democ. Essentially it measures the same as the liberal 
democracy. Score (zero-10) without decimals. 10 being the highest, zero being the lowest. The 
reason that we use two variables that are essentially the same is to check if the results of the test 
might differ or not. 
To analyze the possible effects between democracy and GDP per capita. We will realize a 
Granger causality test. The main idea of this test in words of Helmut Lütkepol in it is book 
“New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis” (2005) is the following:  “cause cannot 
come after the effect. Thus, if a variable x affects a variable z, the former should help improving 
the predictions of the latter variable”. In other words, with this test what will find is what vari-
able comes before in the times series (StatisticsHowTo). It is not technically causality, but we 
will complement it with the qualitative analysis. 
We will use the Toda and Yamamoto (1996) approach to test for Granger Causality. We will 
use this approach because it allows to create and test the different variables in levels instead of 
having to take differences. As Mavrotas and Kelly puts it: “it is possible that incorrect infer-
ences could be made about the issue of causality simply because of the sensitivity of stationary 
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or cointegration tests.” (2001,  100) We will test for the order of integration because the basis 
of this approach is to use the order of integration number as a lag for the VAR. The Vector Auto 
regression or VAR is a vector formed by different time series using the same model. This pro-
cedure is to solve the problems that might arise when using the Wald test to test for Granger 






We follow the six steps identified by Dave Giles in its blog (2011) necessary to perform the 
Granger Causality test:  
1st Perform an Augmented Dickey Fuller test to check for the order integration6 and also see if 
the variable is stationary7 or not. When testing for this, we only care about two things. The first 
one is seeing if the two variables analyzed in each case (liberal democracy/GDP per capita and 
Polity IV democracy/GDP per capita) share the same order of integration, because if they do 
we will need to test for cointegration. The other one is to see what variable has the highest order 
of integration, because we will add the same number of lags to our VAR as the highest order of 
integration that we find in our variables (if we have one variable that is integrated of order zero 
and another one that is integrated of order one, we will add one extra lag to our VAR)     
2nd Then we need to perform the Engle-Granger test, to check for cointegration8. The reason to 
do this test is that if the variables are cointegrated. We want to check for integration due to rule 
related to the Granger Causality test that says the following: If we have cointegration we will 
find either unidirectional or bidirectional granger causality between any of the variables being 
tested. In other words, if we have cointegration we will have Granger causality  
3rd We need to choose the appropriate number of lags for the VAR. For this we will use different 
information criteria (AIC, Hainan-Quin, Schwartz). We will choose the lag that presents the 
lowest loss of information (Lower number in the different information criteria) 
4th After choosing the appropriate number of lags for the VAR, we will need to test for the 
normality in the residuals. The reason behind is that if the residuals are correlated, then some 
of the causality power is hidden behind the residuals. Which means that the results that the 
Granger Test give would be incorrect, or we would end rejecting when we do not have to reject. 
                                                             
6 The order of the Integration is the number of times that we have to differentiate a variable to make it stationary.  
7 Stationarity is the concept that happens when a time series variable is able to keep constant overtime all of its main charac-
teristics (mean, variance and autocorrelation). Thus allowing a better forecasting.  
8 According to StatisticsHowTo two variables are cointegrated if “a linear combination of those variables has a lower order 




5th After completing all of the tests and seeing how everything is normal, we will build the VAR 
model. We will use the following formula:          
Source Dave Giles 
 
The number of lags that we will use will depend on the highest order of integration and also on 
the different information criteria. 
6th After building the VAR we can proceed with the Granger testing. As mentioned before, 
when we test for the Granger causality in the test the number of degrees of freedom will match 
the number of lags that the information criteria gives. In the test we will not use the number of 
lags coming from the order of integration, those are only there to solve the problems that arise 
when testing non-stationary series using a normal Wald test. 
2.2 Qualitative Analysis 
This analysis is broader in terms of time than the quantitative one to try to capture historical 
factors and to compare them with Acemoglu et al theory (that is, we look at the presence of 
non-economic factors). Taking the total length of our time series plot for democracy (variable 
lib_democracy from the database v-dem) of around 119 years (1900-2019) as presented in 
Graph three, we can distinguish four periods of interest.  
The first period should cover the years that preceded the 1936 (including those before 1900). 
We want to know how the events that happened from the discovery of the island till the 1936 
helped in creating the proper environment for the development of the island. The second pe-
riod is the one around the first big spike on democracy in 1947. We will try to discover what 
happened in the island at that time in 1947 (the first big spike). The third period is constituted 
by the years around the biggest spike in 1967, when Mauritius gained independence from the 
United Kingdom. The fourth period will help us obtain a picture of what is Mauritius today 
The sources that we have used for this analysis are three: book, papers and article from the in-
ternet. The book title is “why nations fail” (2012), this book give us an insight on how the 
different institutions shape the growth of a country which we will use it for the analysis. For 
the papers we have done a search through JSTOR and google scholar. We have used different 
papers to explain the periods due to the inexistence of a single book that explains the political 
and economic history of Mauritius. For the first period (1638-1900) we use the paper named 
“Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Laborers in colonial Mauritius” by Richard Allen (1999) 
and the article “Role of Indians in Mauritius” by Kauleshwar Rai and Kayleshwar Rai (1983). 
This paper and article explains really well from the political and economic view, the first 
years of Mauritius as a colony. For the second period we use the article titled “BRITISH CO-
LONIAL POLICY, LOCAL POLITICS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MAURITIAN WEL-
FARE STATE, 1936—50” by Jeremy Seekings (2011). This article is more centered in the po-
litical history. For the third period (1966-1968) we use the article titled “Institutions, Eco-
nomic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation in Mauritius” by Deborah Bräutigam (1997) 
and the paper named “Mauritius Independence and Dependence” written by Jean Houbert 
(1981). This paper and article provides us with a really good insight of what was Mauritius 
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during those periods. For the last period (independence-nowadays) we have selected the paper 
“Origins of the Democratic Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius” by Richard San-
brook (2005). This papers starts analyzing the country from the independence up until the 21st 
century 




To test the hypothesis that democracy has a positive effect on the economic development of a 
country, we propose to study the case of Mauritius, an African country which is both more 
developed and democratic than the rest.  To do so, first we will perform the quantitative analysis 
(Granger Causality using the Toda and Yamamoto approach) But we will not say if the hypoth-
esis is rejected or not, because first we want to perform the next step. The next step will consist 
in analyzing the country development using a qualitative analysis (Historical, Political and also 
economic) and looking for the presence of non-economic factors. After performing this analy-
sis, we will compare the results we get with the ones obtained by the quantitative analysis and 









V. RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter present the results obtained from the quantitative analysis. We will be using the 
variables in logs. The difference in the scale of which the variables are measured is quite big. 
Thus measuring in logs will help reduce the extremes and also have a better picture.  
  Graph 2: Time series plot of the log gdp per capita against the log of liberal democracy. 
 This is a first step in order to know if democracy is helping GDP per capita grow or maybe is 
GDP the one helping democracy (As we get rich we demand more rights). We see that the 
variables are moving to the same direction, what we need to do know is check whether they are 
stationary or not. We also need to check if the variables are cointegrated, in the case of the 












Graph 3: Time series plot of the log GDP/Polity IV scale of democracy     
If we look at this plot we might think that there is no correlation or anything that relates these 
two variables but that is not true. The main difference between the two plots, is that in this one 
the variable democracy is a discrete one (can only take values that go from one-10 with no 
decimals) but this does not mean anything. We see in this plot that in 1982, Mauritius grade 
was raised from a nine to a 10, but we did not see the effect of this in the GDP per capita until 
three years after.  
2.  ADF test                                                               
As explained in the methodological chapter, the first step to perform the Granger Causality test: 
is to determine the order of integration. We do that by performing an ADF test on the three 
variables. The first thing that we have to do is test if the variables are integrated of order two or 




We find that all of the three variables present p-values lower than the significance level (5%) 
which means that we reject the null hypothesis that the variables are integrated of order two. 
We thus perform the test again but in the null hypothesis we have that the variable is inte-
grated of order one and in the alternative, we put that the variable is integrated of order zero.  





Table 2: ADF Liberal Democracy. 























In this new ADF test we find that the variables give out different results. According to this test 
in the case of the liberal democracy we find that the variable is I(0), in other words, we reject 
the null hypothesis. While GDP per capita and Polity IV democracy do not reject the null which 
means that the variables are integrated of order one. Which means that we will have to perform 





3.  Cointegration test 
To test if the variables Polity IV and GDP per capita we will use the Engle and Granger test. 
This test consists in the following steps:                                                                                                          
1st: We need to create a model that we will use in the OLS regression. In our case the model is 
the following. 
  
 2nd: With this model we create an OLS regression, from this OLS regression we save the re-
siduals because the order of integration of the residuals tell us if we have a cointegrating rela-
tionship. This happens when the residuals have an order of integration I(0). To check the order 
of integration of the residuals, we will need to make and ADF test where the null hypothesis is 
that the residuals are integrated of order one (no cointegration) while the alternative is that the 
residuals are integrated of order zero (cointegration).  
Table 5: Engle and Granger Cointegration Analysis (Polity IV, GDP per capita). 
We see that the ADF test for the residuals gives a p-value of 0.54 which is way higher than 5%. 
This p-value means that we do not reject the null hypothesis which means that the residuals are 
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integrated of order one. These two variables are not cointegrated. The reason we are so inter-
ested in testing for cointegration, is due to the fact that having cointegration assures causality 
either one or both ways. But not finding it does not mean that causality is over. We can have 
causality without cointegration.  
4.  VAR lag selection 
After checking for the order of integration and cointegration, the next step is to build the Vector 
Auto Regression model that we will use for our Granger non-causality test. To build the VAR 
we need to select the lags that we will use in the model. To do that we will use the different 
information criteria available. We will choose the number of lags that presents the lower loss 
of information (the smallest number).                                                                                
Table 6: VAR lag selection Liberal democracy/GDP per Capita. 
 












 According to the different information criteria (Akaike, Schwartz, Hainan) that we have in 
this test, the number of lags that we choose is one. For the VAR of liberal democracy and 
GDP per Capita we have one lag plus another due to the fact that GDP per Capita is integrated 





















Here, we see that for the VAR model in this case build with the variables Polity IV democracy 
and GDP per capita. We also choose the one with only one lag plus another from the order of 
integration (Toda and Yamamoto p+m approach) 
Before building the VAR model to test for the Granger non-causality, we need to test for serial 
autocorrelation of the residuals. The reason behind that is that residuals need to behave in a 
random way to have an optimum model. In the case that they do not do that, we would find 
ourselves in a scenario where the residuals have information from the past that could be im-
portant for our forecasts in the present. In other words, our testing would not be optimum be-
cause the residuals are hiding part of the causality. The Granger non-causality could give out 
wrong answers (RH0 when we should NRH0). 
5.  Residual autocorrelation 
To test for this serial autocorrelation we use the residual serial correlation LM test. The hypoth-




















We choose three lags cause is the number that the program offers automatically. We see that 
the p-value of the first lag is higher than 0.05 (level of confidence). This means that we do not 
have to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Not rejecting the hypothesis means 
that we can use a VAR(with one lag) model plus another one of the order of integration. This 
was the model that the lag order selection criteria proposed.   
Table 9: Serial Correlation Test GDP per capital/Polity IV democracy. 















For the VAR model that contains the GDP per capita and the democracy score according to 
Polity IV. We find the same result. The model proposed by the information criteria (one lag 
plus one more for the order of integration) is a good one because the model does not present 
serial autocorrelation in the residuals. The p-value for one lag is 0.8248 far bigger than 0.05. 
Meaning that we do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
6.  Granger Test  
The last step of this quantitative analysis is to build the two VAR models to test the Granger 
non-causality. For the building of the VARs we use a normal one with one lag and another extra 
for the order of integration (two of the three analyzed variables are I(1)).  
As the reader remembers, we are testing the Granger non-causality test proposed by Toda and 
Yamamoto. In this test the null hypothesis is that the variable: liberal democracy/Polity IV/GDP 
per capita does not granger cause the other variable being tested, while the alternative is that 
the variable granger causes the other.  
Table 10: Granger Causality Test GDP per capita/liberal democracy. 
                            











After performing the Granger non-causality test. We find the results summarized in Table 10. 
The values of p-values all of them are bigger than our 5% level of confidence, means that we 
do not reject the null hypothesis. If we remember from the beginning the null hypothesis is that 
the variable x does not granger cause the variable y. This means that neither GDP per capita or 





Table 11: Granger Causality Test GDP per capita/Polity IV democracy.  












Unfortunately, in table 11,we find the same results as in the other granger test that we per-
formed. The p-values are way bigger than our 5% level of confidence. Which means that we do 
not reject the null hypothesis of no granger causality. 
7.  Conclusion  
From the results, we can see that none of the two democracy variables that we choose granger 
cause GDP per capita. However, this does not meant that we have to accept that democracy has 
a null or negative effect on the growth of country. We need to perform the qualitative analysis 
to have a definitive answer. Our justification comes from the definition of the test itself: “if 
X1 "Granger-causes" (or "G-causes") X2, then past values of X1 should contain information that 
helps predict X2 above and beyond the information contained in past values of X2”(Scholar-
pedia). In the formula of creation for the democracy variables, the authors do not include  
GDP_per_capita. Which means that these democracy variables may not contain any residual of 
the effect that an increase of GDP per capita could have in the variables and values forming 








VI. RESULTS QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The objective of this chapter is to further test the value of the hypothesis that democracy has 
positive effects in the income growth of a country. The qualitative analysis allows for a study 
in depth of the economic, political and social evolution of Mauritius so as to test the Acemoglu 
et al (2012) thesis that democracy is a factor of development because it implies an inclusive 
rather extractive institutional model. As explained in the methodological chapter (chapter three) 
and also in chapter two, to carry out the analysis we have divided the history of the country into 
four periods taking into account the time plot of the variable lib_democracy. This chapter is 
thus divided into four sections, one for each of these periods.  
1. First period (1638-1900) 
The colonial power that tried to colonize Mauritius first was the Netherlands in 1638. The Dutch 
gave the name of Mauritius to the island, in honor of Maurice of Nassau (the commander in 
chief in the war against the Spanish). The original plan of the Dutch was to create a station of 
transit for the ships that where travelling from the Netherlands to the colonies located in East 
Asia (Indonesia). This plan failed due to the resistance that the native population put up against 
being colonized. The lack of willingness from the natives plus the lack of natural resources 
caused the Dutch to abandon the island in the early 1700’s. This episode, from Daron Acemoglu 
et al perspective, is indication that Mauritius had development potential. Here we see the ex-
ample of one of the theories proposed by Daron Acemoglu. Daron Acemoglu and James Rob-
inson (2012) explain that the tribes that resist or do not get colonized, have a better chance of 
developing into richer countries or regions than the ones that get colonized. The reason behind 
is that countries that get colonized, have a greater chance of suffering from extractive institu-
tions. Extractive institutions are created by the settlers as a method to extract all of the possible 
resources (natural or human) from the colonized country. The most common extractive institu-
tions are: slavery, confiscation of land, stripping the native institution from its land, massive 
deforestation, and gigantic plantations of a single crop (sugar, bananas, tobacco…) Neverthe-
less, Mauritius was indeed colonized some years later.    
After being abandoned for 10 years, in 1721 a group of French settlers from the French com-
pany of the Indies arrived at the island. They build a maritime base and a settlement (Port Louis) 
in the 1730’s, Soon the base became a very important asset for the French empire. The role of 
the civil population during those years was to produce the products to maintain the French 
forces in the island (Allen, 1999). Probably one of the two most important dates during the 
French control is 1767. That is the year that the island control passed from the company to the 
French Kingdom. The first order of business of the new rulers was the creation of a plantation 
colony like the ones the Kingdom had in the Caribbean. This “plantation” colony failed due to 
a variety of reasons. The first one is that plantations were not profitable due to the competition 
with the colonies with bigger and better plantations that made nearly impossible to obtain good 
profits from that activity in the island. The second reason was the recurrent natural disasters 
(flooding and hurricanes mostly). The third reason were the profits that one could make in the 
sea (military/civil) due to the strategical location of Mauritius. The island is located between 
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India and Africa. In those times the biggest and busiest commercial route in the whole world. 
This was the route that the English and other European merchant ships used to get from Europe 
to East Asia and back. Obviously the French did not missed the chance of using the base as the 
port from where the naval forces could attack the ships of their biggest rivals at that time and 
also be used as a trade area for merchants of around the world.  
In 1784 Port Louis was designated a free port for merchants of all around the world. The pres-
ence of Port Louis both as a base for the French army and also as a free port was so profitable 
for the French and so damaging for the British that the latter ended up invading and taking the 
control of the island in 1810. Four years later the two countries agreed in the Treaty of Paris, 
that the French would keep the control and sovereignty of the Reunion while the British ob-
tained the control of Mauritius.  
Here we see a good example for two theories. The first one is the geographical theory proposed 
by Jared Diamond. Mauritius provide a good example on how the natural disasters helped to 
prevent Mauritius from becoming a plantation colony. Another example is the location of Mau-
ritius. This location in the middle of the biggest commercial route helped to provide other 
sources of income (trade and war) instead of the normal one that was the creation of a plantation 
economy. The other is the theory of Daron Acemoglu et al (2004) on how the decision made 
by an institution (the French governor) brought to the island fortune and prosperity. The deci-
sion was to made Port Louis a free port.  
One of the requisites of France for giving Mauritius to the UK in the Treaty of Paris, was that 
settlers could stay and keep their properties that they could continue using the French language 
and also that in matters of justice, the settlers could use the French law.   The social structure 
of Mauritius at the moment they got incorporated into the British kingdom, was fairly different 
from its other colonies. The bankruptcy of the French company of the Indies, allowed every 
French person the possibility of trading with other merchants or even the possibility of starting 
their own business. The designation of Port Louis as a free port accentuated the possibilities of 
becoming part of the bourgeoisie. Other important decision that helped to create this social 
structure was the decision adopted by the Company and also by the French Kingdom and pos-
terior Republic to give out for free or at really low prices land around the island.  As one can 
imagine the social structure of Mauritius in that time was formed by small plantation (sugar) 
owners, rural and urban proletariat and finally the incipient bourgeoisie of the trading business. 
Instead of having extractive institutions, the Mauritian businesses had to rely on trade and com-
petitiveness of prices. 
The first big issue with the incorporation of Mauritius to the UK, was that the island was forced 
to abandon its role as a commercial hub in the Indic ocean. This was due to the existence of a 
series of laws called the Navigation Acts. Passed by the English Parliament in the 16th, 17th and 
18th these laws regulated the different types of trades that a colony could do with other countries 
that were not part of the UK. These Acts forced the local bourgeoisie to invest in another type 
of business, now that trade was out of the picture. The movement of investment money from 
the trade and ship building into sugar plantations was a must. In that time the only type of 
plantation that was giving profits. Those who invested in sugar were rewarded when in 1825, 
the preferential tariff for sugar from Western India was revoked. This event caused a massive 
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increase in the numbers of plantations and the amount of money that was invested in each one 
of those creating a connection of a product and a country that continues nowadays.  
The sugar business was not as prosperous as it looked at that time. The excessive power that 
the sugar plantations had over the whole economy, was too much to bear (from all of the ex-
portations of this island, sugar accounted for more than 80%). This excessive dependence that 
the country wealth had from the price of sugar was translated into a series of ups and downs in 
terms of recession and growth. Exacerbated by the fact that most of the plantations where sup-
ported by local capital. The investors from the metropolis had no interest in investing in the 
island due to the scarce profits that one could make. In 1880’s the progressive decay of the 
profits and the inability to adapt the new technologies into the fields, provoked the division of 
the biggest plantations into smaller ones owned by the ex-workers or other businessmen. This 
division was the final point in the transition from a plantocracy into a “developmental” capitalist 
colony.                                                                                                                                                           
The first and most important source that Mauritius had during most of its existence as a colony 
was the use of African slaves as forced labor. These were introduced by the French in the 17th 
and 18th centuries. Their main role was to work in the incipient sugar fields and also as artisans 
in Port Louis. The work was so brutal and demanding that it caused the death of thousands of 
slaves. This is thought as one of the reasons why the owners of plantations during the French 
ownership were able to secure small profits from their plantations (not as big as the profits 
obtained by the merchants). When the British colonized the island one of the first things to 
change was that the trading of slaves was no longer permitted. The ownership was, the trading 
not. We mentioned above how the mortality was really high, without being able to import 
slaves, the slave population would soon disappear (the mortality was especially high for the 
adult males). The answer of the owners against this prohibition was to trade illegally for the 
slaves with the help of the local authorities. This illegal trading continued to happen until 1835 
(the year that slavery was abolished through the British Empire).  
Once slavery was abolished, the colonial government started looking for new manpower 
sources of work, which they found in India (the biggest colony of the empire). Before talking 
about the Indian immigration, we need to make a difference between the two types of Indian 
immigrants that arrived in Mauritius. The first ones where the so-called voluntary immigrants: 
traders that went to Port Louis to trade with different commodities, they also bought some land 
from the big plantations. The second ones were the indentured laborers. The ones that were 
hired to perform the work of the slaves. As time passed these Indian immigrants started to form 
their own social classes. The indentured laborers were divided into three groups. At the top we 
had the job contractors, immigrants who knew French (At the treaty of Paris one of the requi-
sites was that the British had to allow the settlers to speak French) and controlled several hun-
dred men to be used in any plantation that paid the job contractor. In the middle we find the so-
called Overseers, immigrants that were in charge of supervising that everything was functioning 
properly in the plantation. In the bottom we find the immigrants who had to do the manual job. 
The big difference between these immigrants and the slaves is that the former had a salary and 
a contract. When the contract was about to expire, it was normal to see the owner of the plan-
tation offering small plots of land and some livestock to the immigrants so they would stay in 
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the same plantation. This was the most usual way for an immigrant to ascend in the social scale. 
As we mentioned above in the 1880’s, keeping large plantations was no longer profitable. The 
money was made in the processing of the sugar. In response to these changes of the markets. 
The owners started to give bigger (loan) portions of their lands to the immigrants working for 
them. The only requisite was that the sugar would be processed in the factory of the owner (The 
owner would keep a portion of the benefits). This process was called the “morcellement9” it is 
considered by many as one of the reasons why Mauritius had a better development than most 
of the African countries. From Daron Acemoglu et al perspective, it indicates a shift from an 
extractive to a more inclusive institutional model.                                                                                       
2.   Second Period (1936-1950)  
To understand this period we need to have a small flashback. Through the first 20 years of the 
20th century, Mauritius was riddled with economic crises due to the effects that the great de-
pression had on the price of sugar worldwide. In the social part of the country, we find that the 
“morcellement” gave birth to a small and quite poor bourgeoisie of small landowners and petite 
traders.  
In the 20th century, we find Mauritius society divided into four groups. The first one was the 
working class. They were the ones working in the sugar plantations, comprised mostly of the 
Indian indentured labor. The second one was the immigrants that had progressed more. Indians, 
Creole or Africans who worked as lawyers, doctors or merchants. The third group was the own-
ers of the sugar plantations and mills. Surprisingly this group is formed by the French settlers 
that stayed in the island. The fourth and final group was the government officials, all of them 
from the UK or other British colonies. 
After this petite introduction, we go back to 1936. As the reader might remember in those times, 
Mauritius growth and wealth was extremely dependent on the price of sugar, a price that plum-
meted due to the great depression. This caused a recession that was especially hard for the poor, 
wages were reduced and the already bad conditions that the workers had, were worsened by the 
estate owners. This recession happened in the middle of an international campaign to give more 
rights to the different colonies, inside Mauritius a political party was about to appear. This 
political party was the Mauritius Labour Party (MLP) whose leader Maurice Cure, a doctor of 
creole origins, demanded rights for the poor (education, health and pensions) and the possibility 
that all men could vote in the elections. The issue with the MLP is that it was the colonial 
government considered them an element of agitation not a political party, due to the role that 
the party had in the 1937 and 1943 riots, by the British authorities in the island. The thing that 
saved the MLP of disappearing was the strong relation that the MLP had with the British Labour 
Party (BLP). This relation was so strong that the BLP often intervened to calm things and force 
changes in the island. This relation was also important in the sense that the BLP helped the 
MLP with their demands and also giving them vital information of what was going on in the 
UK. As Jeremy Seekings (2011, 165) put it: “Mauritian Workers depended on the British equity 
to extend to the workers of the empire the social and political reforms which have led to the 
progressive state occupied today by European workers (Quote by the MLP)”. This means that 
                                                             
9 Fragmentation in french. 
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the Mauritian workers depended from the British to obtain the information and to pass the laws 
that were necessary to improve their lives.  
Even though Clifford was considered a progressist, his government was characterized as one 
that continued to be with the rich owners, and also that the laws passed by his government were 
ill written or did not solve the problem. In the 1940’s the situation did not improve because the 
UK adopted the idea (very much a Lipset approach) that introducing these reforms (pensions, 
health and social insurance) before developing the country could not work because the people 
living in those countries did not have the education and income level to support them. The idea 
was to develop before an insurance. The argument was that families had the role of protecting 
(insure) those who cannot work for themselves.  
Things started to change in terms of the quality of democracy in 1948. This was due to the fact 
that 1948 was the year, which the law that awarded voting rights to every literate man was 
passed. It was also the year that the legislative council was formed. The reformists won the 
elections that year. The biggest victory of this council was the introduction of the non-contrib-
utory pensions in 1950. 
Many historians have noted that the event that saved Mauritius from the policies that were 
applied in the rest of Africa, was the lack of land to create more productive plantations of food 
across the country. This is the policy that the British followed in the continent: increase the 
production of commodities and offer some services and the rest (welfare and poverty mitigating 
programes) would come after. Again, this evolution that Mauritius suffered is in consonance 
with the Acemoglu et al theory that inclusive institutional models tend to lead towards democ-
racy and thus a higher economic growth in the long run.  
3. Third Period (1966-1968) 
The years that preceded this period were characterized by the amount of reforms that took place 
in the island. Increasing the monthly pension wage, lowering the qualifying age and increment-
ing the number of social assistance programs and also universal suffrage was approved in 1959. 
That is a big change of the situation compared to 1930.  
In the 1960s we have a big division between the Indians and the Creoles. The first ones were 
the offspring of the indentured labor that was brought in the 19 th century. Thanks to the “mor-
cellement” process and the benefits given by the colonial government, they had reached posi-
tions of power both as civil servants and also as planters. Being the majority of population of 
Mauritius, they were one of the groups that created the MLP, which they ended up controlling. 
This position of control in the society gave them special status with the British. Actually, the 
British desired that once left the island, the Indians would take control of the new country. The 
problem was that the Indians were not alone in the island. The island was also inhabited by the 
offspring’s of the French settlers, the civil servants of color, the ex-slaves that lost their jobs 
when the Indians came, the Chinese business owners and small groups of Muslims, who united 
thanks to their common fear towards the Indians. 
In response of the Indians taking control of the MLP, the other ethnicities created the Parti 
mauricien social democrat or PMSD. This political party was controlled by the white elite of 
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the sugar plantations with the support of the other groups due to the fear they had of the Indians.    
The two political parties clashed in some topics especially in the independence one.  
The 1960s was the time that all the colonial powers started to allow for independence in their 
colonies and Mauritius was not an exception. As one can imagine the two main parties clashed 
big in this discussion. The PMSD wanted to become part of the United Kingdom, so the white 
owners could continue to sell their sugar in the UK plus a possible access to the newly formed 
European Economic Community once the UK formalized their entrance. On the other hand the 
MLP wanted the independence. Paradoxically the UK was more in favor of the independence 
of Mauritius, because the country was still underdeveloped and it was very expensive to main-
tain. However, they wanted control of the atoll called Diego Garcia, that belongs to an archi-
pelago called the Chagos islands, that where part of Mauritius in that time. The reason of this 
interest is that the Americans wanted to build a base in the Indian Ocean and this atoll was the 
perfect size for them to build a military base there. To obtain this archipelago Britain tricked 
the MLP by making them believe that they were willing to accept a referendum of union to the 
UK. The MLP seeing that the polls were in favor of the PMSD, did not want to take the risk of 
losing their chance of becoming independents due to an archipelago. The MLP ended up ac-
cepting the loss of the archipelago in exchange of three million pounds and the help of the 
British in the upcoming elections.                                                             
The pro-independence movement won and independence was declared. The following days 
different conflicts appeared through the country, especially in Port Louis. The agitators of these 
conflicts were the black and Muslims who thought they would lose everything because the 
Indians had the power now. The interesting thing about this was the fact that the white owners 
discovered that the Indians shared the same values as them in terms of the sugar interests and 
private property. This discovery fueled the coalition of the MLP and the PMSD in every single 
government in Mauritius, until recently.  
4.  Fourth Period (Mauritius since the independence to today) 
After the independence we find that the excessive reliance of the country on the sugar exports 
was not solved, they accounted for over 95% of the total exports of the country. The first years 
of Mauritius as an independent country could be described as difficult and riddled with prob-
lems: overpopulation (especially after the forced exile of the inhabitants of the Chagos islands), 
an economic crisis and ethnic tensions due to the fear that the creoles had against the Indians. 
Mauritius had a high chance of ending like the other countries were democracy was a failed 
experiment. The differences that saved Mauritius was that the MLP and the PMSD shared the 
same ideology (Fabian socialism10) and also that the electoral system of Mauritius was created 
to avoid one-party governments and the over-representation of a single ethnic group. 
The electoral system of Mauritius was created following a consociational11 system. This system 
divides the country into twenty districts that have three members that can be elected in the 
elections (there is an island called Rodriguez that is a district on its own and has two eligible 
                                                             
10 Fabian socialism was an ideology inside the BLP, that preferred to progress more slowly in terms of development, so the 
population and the state could carry the new burden   
11 Electoral system that is followed by divided societies, based on coalitions governments to avoid tensions. 
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members). From these 62 members, eight are assigned to the so called “best losers”. This is 
important because Mauritius follows the British system to elect the members of first-(in the 
case of Mauritius three)-past-the-post.  In simple terms, the different voters of the districts have 
to vote for three candidates and the ones who are elected are the ones who receive the highest 
number of votes. We have to remember that the eight best losers also receive a seat. The objec-
tive is avoiding a single party government. This is a clear example of an inclusive institution 
accordinf to Acemoglu. 
Back to the history. The coalition formed by the MLP and the PMSD was vital for the creation 
of the Export Processing Zones (EPZ). The origin and reason for these zones was to reduce the 
excessive power that sugar exportations had in the Mauritian economy and to change the econ-
omy from a protected economy whose main source of income was exporting primary commod-
ities to an export manufacturing one. These EPZ were build following the example of the NIC’s 
in East Asia. The EPZ had really low taxes as one of the objectives was to attract foreign and 
local (the rich owners from the sugar plantations) investment.  
In the political area, the appearance of the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) a party 
whose main objective was a communist revolution to expand the social and assistance pro-
grammes, challenged the established coalition The coalition feared that this new party could 
win the 1972 election and destroy everything that these two parties had built. In response of 
this threat the Mauritian government arrested the leaders of the MMM and canceled the 1972 
elections. This was a crucial moment in the establishment of the democracy in Mauritius. What 
would have happened if the MMM turned violent due to the arrest of their leaders or that the 
coalition decided that their control was better than democracy. Instead the MMM pressured for 
smaller reforms and abandoned the idea of a revolution and embraced social democracy. The 
coalition seeing these changes decided to host the 1976 elections.  
The MMM won but, thanks to the Mauritian electoral system, the government was a coalition 
formed by the MLP and PMSD. That same year the oil crisis started, with this crisis came the 
sugar crisis, people during crisis in those times did not bought sugar. With the recession and 
the protests (with the help of the MMM) going on in the whole country,  the government was 
forced to increase the amount that was destined to social policies (also the wages of the public 
workers were increased). These policies only caused a deeper recession which at the end forced 
the government to ask for the help of the IMF and the WB. These organizations asked for a 
series of reforms and cuts in the public budget. These reforms included: new taxes, the increase 
of wages should be smaller than the increase in consumer prices, reduction of the social benefits 
that the poor could use (food vouchers, education and healthcare benefits, subsidies) and finally 
the devaluation of the Mauritian rupee. These reforms caused heavy protests that ended in the 
1982 election. This election was won by the MMM. 
With the victory of the MMM everyone expected these reforms to come to an end. What no one 
saw it coming, was that this MMM was more moderated compared to the one in 1976. When 
the MMM reached the government, they acknowledged the importance that these reforms had 
for the country and the necessity to keep applying them. Obviously, this change of plan caused 
a division in the MMM and the birth of a new party called the Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien 
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(MSM). These new party joined the MLP to win the 1983 elections. Thanks in part to the re-
forms and also to the recovery in the price of sugar, the new government was able to leave the 
programs of the IMF and the WB. The new focus was to attract foreign companies to invest in 
the EPZ through a combination of fiscal benefits (low taxes, duty free and the possibility of 
exporting to new markets thanks to the different treaties that Mauritius had with different coun-
tries). 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the government idea was to transform Mauritius from a manufacturing 
economy into a services one. The two goals of the government were to establish as the main 
country in Africa from where you could invest anywhere in the world. In other words, to estab-
lish your investment firm/banks there. The country has had a minor exit in this field due to the 
lack of opportunities in East Africa.  Nowadays Mauritius is used as a bridge to invest in India. 
Mauritius has a double taxation agreement with India.        
5.  Conclusion 
The history of Mauritius indicates that there is a relationship between democracy and economic 
growth and that democracy has had a positive effect on the economic growth of this island.  If 
the Island would have had natural resources, it may well have become part of an extractive 
colonial model. But this was not the case. In fact, the need for immigrants led to the “morcel-
lement” which played a redistributive role. This process gave birth to a whole new class of 
petite owners that would play a role in the upcoming formation of the country and the emer-
gence of the MLP. Later on, the BLP helped the MLP to ask for the same rights that workers 
had in the UK. The establishment of the legislative council in 1948 and universal suffrage for 
every adult in 1959 were some of their main victories.   
The electoral system in Mauritius was also a catalyst for stability and growth thanks to its in-
clusiveness. In 1968 the country was on the verge of a civil war. The other ethnicities of the 
island feared that the Indians once Mauritius was independent would soon take over everything 
they had, knowing this the lower classes started to riot. What saved the country from this col-
lapse is that the two biggest parties had a lot to lose if this ever happened. Both the MLP and 
PMSD were controlled by the owners of the sugar plantations and the owners of the business 
in the island. These parties created a system that would give a voice to every ethnic group but 
at the same time these groups had to make deals with the others thus giving a sense of national 
unity. To put it another way, without the establishment of an inclusive institutional system, 









 VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this research was to determine whether the developing countries of Africa 
should fight to be democracies when there is literature that argues that the best political system 
to develop a low income country is an authoritarian regime. To try to answer this question, we 
formulated a hypothesis. The hypothesis is that democracy has a positive effect in economic 
growth. To test this hypothesis, we use the country of Mauritius as the case of study. The reason 
Mauritius is used is due to the high standards of its democracy and also the level of development 
that the country has achieved. The objective was to establish whether its level of development 
could have been achieved without its evolution towards democracy.  
We used two approaches quantitative and qualitative to test what type of effect democracy has 
had in the development of Mauritius. We use these approaches because we want to see whether  
they agree in the effect. For the quantitative analysis we use a variation of the Granger causality 
test. The test serves to establish whether the past values of GDP per capita or democracy can 
explain the present values of democracy or GDP per capita; if the past lags of a variable x mixed 
with the past lags of variable y can explain better the present values of variable y, if they do 
then we have causality. For the qualitative analysis we follow a historical analysis of the polit-
ical and economic events that shaped the history of Mauritius and the role that democracy 
played. 
The results that came from the two analyses differ. The Granger test that we have performed in 
the quantitative analysis says that democracy (the two variables that we have tested) does not 
granger-cause GDP per capita. Yet, the results are not conclusive because we also find that 
GDP per capita does not granger-cause democracy (in any of the two variables we have used 
for democracy). This means that neither the past values of democracy and GDP per capita do 
not help to explain better the present values or that we have a problem in the way this analysis 
was built. The problem can come from the way that the variable democracy is built in the forms 
we use in the study. Maybe there is a relation but these three variables failed to capture it, or 
maybe is due to unidentified problems like structural breaks in the time series or other problems 
that we have failed to solve. 
While the results from the quantitative analysis are not conclusive, the results of the qualitative 
analysis do not allow to reject our hypothesis. The historical analysis of the different events that 
happened in the country indicate that democracy has had a positive effect in the economic 
growth of the country. The role that democracy played was to unify the country in times were 
the different ethnicities were ready to go to war by giving them an equal voice in the parliament. 
This role was achieved through the establishment a system that favored coalition governments 
instead of one party this system helped unite the different ethnicities into a unity that continues 
nowadays.  . 
This research thus indicates that democracy can play a role in fostering economic growth by 
offering a system that prevent wars or extreme conflict by giving a democratic tool to every 
citizen so they can express their voice. If the citizens see that the concerns that they might have 
are being heard by the politicians then there is a lesser chance for this citizens to revolt. They 
feel as part of the system thus providing the stability necessary to foster economic growth. It 
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may therefore be an important factor for development especially in countries, like the African, 
which are divided in terms of ethnic groups or religions. But before implementing a similar 
electoral system than the one in Mauritius into other countries we need to check that the differ-
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